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Abstract: The behavioral sciences and Jung‘s analytical psychology are set apart by virtue 
of their respective histories, epistemologies, and definitions of subject matter. This brief 
paper identifies Jung‘s scientific stance, notes perceptions of Jung and obstacles for 
bringing his system of thought into the fold of the behavioral sciences. The impact of the 
―science versus art‖ debate on Jung‘s stance is considered with attention to its unfolding in 
the fin de siècle era.  
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1. Introduction 
To say that there is no place for analytical psychology in the behavioral sciences, does not mean 
that Jung‘s work has no intrinsic value or relevance elsewhere. Insofar as ―behavioral sciences‖ 
denotes traditional modern psychology, analytical psychology may provide at best an Archimedean 
vantage point from which to critique it. Jung took that attitude. The ―modern belief in the primacy of 
physical explanations has led … to a ‗psychology without the psyche,‘ that is, to the view that the 
psyche is nothing but a product of biochemical processes,‖ he contended, and called for summoning up 
―courage to consider the possibility of a ‗psychology with the psyche,‘ that is, a theory of the psyche 
ultimately based on the postulate of an autonomous, spiritual principle‖ ([1], par. 660–661). 
Conversely, analytical psychology could be critiqued from the standpoint of the behavioral sciences, 
especially in terms of its methodology.  
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Jung was making his point in 1931. Twenty-first century behavioral sciences have moved on from 
the psychologies he was criticizing. Yet, there remains the disparity he noted. On the one hand, 
sophisticated mathematical models applying dynamical systems theory, along with insights from brain 
imaging studies, have revitalized the interrelated notions of complexity and emergence. On the other, 
the trend has not resulted in a turn to holistic epistemology (on the contrary, much of it reinforces 
reductionism). While some contemporary Jungian analysts are attuned to conceptual trends in science 
(e.g., [2]), science is not attuned to the concerns of analytical psychology. The excitement about 
―embodied embedded cognition‖ is not without controversy in contemporary cognitive neuroscience 
(see, e.g., [3]); but those debates invariably concern the objective living body, not the subjectivity of 
the lived-in body.  
Pursuits of knowledge in analytical psychology and in the behavioral sciences are set apart by virtue 
of their respective histories, epistemologies, and definitions of subject matter [4–6], as summarized in 
this communication. 
2. How did Modern Psychology Lose the Psyche 
Jung begins his essay ―On the Nature of the Psyche‖ with a historical review [7]. Up to the 
seventeenth century, psychology consisted of numerous doctrines concerning the soul, but thinkers 
spoke from their subjective viewpoint, an attitude that is ―totally alien‖ to the standpoint of modern 
science ([7], par. 343). Incidentally, the German word Seele (soul) is usually translated into English as 
―psyche‖ when Jung writes about his own theory, perhaps because to Anglophone ears of the  
mid-twentieth century ―psyche‖ sounded more scientific than ―soul‖. Jung‘s point was that in the past 
philosophers‘ theorizing was based on a naïve belief in the universal validity of their subjective 
opinions. Having reviewed the objectivity of modern science as an improvement upon pre-Enlightenment 
thinking, he comments that we can never remove ourselves from the subjective situation: ―every science 
is a function of the psyche, and all knowledge is rooted in it‖ ([7], par. 357). Psychology as a science 
thus finds itself in an acute paradox, for ―only the psyche can observe the psyche‖ ([8], par. 384).  
Spelling out the absurdity of the mind trying to observe itself, Comte had relegated psychology to a 
prescientific stage, and contended that psychologists mistook their own fantasies for science [9]. In 
Comte‘s ―metaphysical‖ stage, the supernatural beings of the primitive stage are replaced with 
―abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable 
of producing all phenomena‖ ([9], p. 26). This characterization readily applies to notions of libidinal 
forces and to innate archetypes. In the ―scientific‖ stage, according to Comte, the mind applies itself to 
the study of the laws of phenomena, describing their invariable relations of succession and 
resemblances. The behavioral sciences have aspired towards the positivist ideal. The discipline‘s 
historiography dissociates psychology not only from philosophy but also from ―metaphysical‖  
depth psychology.  
Comte was referring to the long history of psychology as a natural science. Philosophers following 
the Aristotelian tradition regarded the science of the mind as belonging to physics (i.e., the science of 
nature). However, in the twentieth century, psychology became equated with quantitative experimental 
methodology, and this ―scientific‖ character was contrasted with the ―metaphysical‖ character of its 
earlier namesake [10]. Textbooks written by psychologists typically describe psychology as coming 
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into being by virtue of its split from philosophy when Wundt opened the first laboratory in Leipzig in 
1879. Between 1880 and 1920, American psychologists waged a battle against spiritualism and 
psychic research in their attempt to define boundaries for their new discipline [11]. William James 
started his essay ―A Plea for Psychology as a ‗Natural Science‖‘ with the contention that although 
psychology was ―hardly more than what physics was before Galileo … a mass of phenomenal 
description, gossip, and myth,‖ it nonetheless included enough ―real material‖ to justify optimism 
about becoming ―worthy of the name of natural science at no very distant day‖ ([12], p. 146). Four 
decades later, Lewin admitted that the battle ―is not by any means complete,‖ but optimistically opined 
that the ―most important general circumstances which paved the way for Galilean concepts in physics 
are clearly and distinctly to be seen in present-day psychology‖ ([13], p. 22). To date, a Galilean 
revolution has not happened. Yet, as Coon put it, psychology ―has never recovered from its adolescent 
physics envy‖ ([11], p. 143). Although psychologists today seldom compare their science to physics, 
they tend to locate it within the natural sciences. For instance, Fuchs and Milar trace the origins of 
psychology to physiology (not philosophy) and its branching into psychophysics, and then through 
behaviorism to cognitive psychology [14].  
Any telling of history is selective, biased in some way; and the bias serves an agenda. Costall 
exposes ―a comprehensive and highly persuasive myth‖ about the origins of scientific psychology ([15], 
p. 635). He notes that according to most textbooks, psychology began as the study of mind based on 
the introspective method (associated with Wundt‘s laboratory). In reaction to the unreliability of that 
method, behaviorism redefined psychology as the study of behavior, based on experimentation. In 
reaction to the bankruptcy of behaviorism, the cognitive revolution restored the mind as the proper 
subject of psychology, but now with the benefit of the rigorous experimental and statistical methods 
developed by the behaviorists—a storyline that has the structure of Hegelian thesis-antithesis-
synthesis. Revisiting the early literature, Costall demonstrates that all three stages of this history are 
largely fictional. Moreover, ―the inaccuracies and outright inventions of ‗textbook histories‘ are not 
just a question of carelessness. These fictional histories help convey the values of the discipline, and a 
sense of destiny‖ ([15], p. 635).  
The psychoanalytic movement has been written out of that history and destiny (Costall does not 
mention it). However, in Jung‘s time and place, ―medical psychology‖ was more separate from the 
then-new science of psychology than present-day clinical psychology is from the behavioral sciences. 
In late-nineteenth century German universities, vested interests of influential professors played a key 
role in the designation of experimental psychology to the natural sciences [16]. Dilthey regarded 
psychology as belonging in the humanities on grounds that it concerns inner experience [17]. Drawing 
a contrast between the outer experience of nature (which is presented as phenomenal and in isolated 
data) and the inner experience of psychic life, which is holistically presented as a living active reality, 
Dilthey argued that for psychology to imitate a method that was successful in the natural sciences 
would involve treating an interconnected whole as if it were merely an assemblage of discrete entities. 
It would mean overriding descriptions of the subjectively lived experience in favor of the  
hypothetico-deductive method [18]. This argument has lost out in university departments; but it is 
implicitly sustained by analytical psychology to date. 
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3. Jung’s Scientific Stance 
Foucault attributed the creation of the modern ―soul‖ to historical conditions set in motion in the 
eighteenth century. Concepts such as psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc., were 
created so as to carve out domains of analyzing the post-Enlightenment soul, building upon it 
―scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism‖ ([19], p. 30). The moral 
claim is implicit in Jung‘s statement, ―We doctors are forced, for the sake of our patients, … to tackle 
the darkest and most desperate problems of the soul, conscious all the time of the possible 
consequences of a false step‖ ([20], par. 170). Yet, it is a paradox of modernity that when we seek to 
apply scientific techniques and discourses, the soul—the seat of subjectivity—vanishes. 
Jung was a man of science by virtue of being a medical doctor, but he was not a scientist. He 
averred that unlike experimental psychology, analytical psychology does not isolate functions and then 
subject them to experimental conditions, but is ―far more concerned with the total manifestation of the 
psyche as a natural phenomenon‖ ([20], par. 170). To him, the totality includes the unconscious as well 
as conscious mind. Being centered on the unconscious characterizes analytical psychology as a 
psychology with the psyche; and this characterization means that it would ―certainly not be a modern 
psychology,‖ since ―all modern ‗psychologies without the psyche‘ are psychologies of consciousness, 
for which an unconscious psychic life simply does not exist‖ ([1], par. 658).  
However, his psychology does not merely state that an unconscious exists. It is premised on the 
notion that its existence can be demonstrated through observations of its effects. In this regard, his 
psychology is modern. It subscribes to the worldview—not the method—of modern science. As Weber 
put it in 1918, ―The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, 
above all, by the ‗disenchantment of the world‖‘ ([21], p. 155); (see [22] for a historian‘s account of 
this worldview). The model of the psyche that Jung was formulating in the same era could be viewed 
as an attempt to rationalize and intellectualize the enchantment of the world in myths, beliefs in the 
supernatural, and so forth.  
Jung unwaveringly professed a scientific stance, as did Freud. Making a case for psychoanalysis as 
a science, Freud defined Weltanschauung (worldview) as ―an intellectual construction which solves all 
the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis‖ ([23], p. 195). 
Unlike religion, the Weltanschauung of science does not provide final answers. It ―too assumes the 
uniformity of the explanation of the universe; but it does so only as a program, the fulfillment of which 
is relegated to the future‖ ([23], p. 196). Jung took a more categorical view: ―A science can never be a 
Weltanschauung but merely a tool with which to make one‖ ([8], par. 731). Therefore ―Analytical 
psychology is not a Weltanschauung but a science, and as such it provides the building-material … 
with which a Weltanschauung can be built up‖ ([8], par. 730).  
From the standpoint of behavioral sciences, depth psychology is a Weltanschauung that purports to 
solve all the mysteries of mind and behavior on the basis of one overriding (and irrefutable) 
hypothesis; namely, there is an unconscious mind. Could the unconscious be an object for scientific 
study? Such an object must exist independently of any description or interpretation of it and potentially 
be knowable in its entirety. Jung recognized the problems inherent in applying those criteria to the 
study of the psyche. Modern psychology ―does not exclude the existence of faith, conviction, and 
experienced certainties of whatever description, nor does it contest their possible validity,‖ he pointed 
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out, but ―completely lacks the means to prove their validity in the scientific sense‖ ([24], par. 384). 
The dilemma stems from a mismatch between what we may want psychology to do for us (explain 
matters of faith, etc.) and what the scientific method permits us to do.  
The history of psychology in general could be viewed as an ongoing struggle with that dilemma. 
Often the ―solution‖ has been to construe what Jung regarded as expressions of the psyche as being 
epiphenomena of either brain processes or language. As William James vividly put it, scientific 
thinking regards our private selves like ―bubbles on the foam which coats a stormy sea … their 
destinies weigh nothing and determine nothing‖ ([25], p. 495). Yet nevertheless there is the reality of 
an ―unshareable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of his individual destiny,‖ a feeling that 
―may be sneered as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the measure of our concrete 
actuality‖ ([25], p. 499). Jung could be viewed as endeavoring to formulate a system of concepts 
towards the systematic description of how that unshareable feeling becomes shareable—not only with 
other people, but first and foremost with one‘s conscious self. It becomes accessible to conscious 
reflection through spontaneous symbolic representations of subjective states, Jung tells us throughout 
his works.  
4. Perceptions of Jung from the Standpoint of Scientific Psychology 
Jung engaged with matters that were central to the formation of psychology as a modern science in 
the early twentieth century [26]. His early theory of the complexes, supported by the word association 
tests [27], accorded well with the experimental psychology of the day. Piaget still engaged with Jung‘s 
theory in 1946 [28]; but by then Jung had fallen from grace in his home discipline, psychiatry.  
A browse through archives of Nature is illuminating. In a 1942 book review, the reviewer 
derogatorily labeled the Jungian approach a mystical psychology [29]. While applauding Jung‘s early 
theory of the complexes as ―scientific as any made before or since‖ in psychiatry, he reflected that 
Jung subsequently ―abandoned his clinical work and most unfortunately started upon the study of 
religions and myths,‖ having ―forsaken science for religion‖ ([29], p. 622). The critic misconstrued 
what Jung was doing. Jung was trying to explain religion scientifically. Nevertheless, after the word 
association experiments, the way Jung develops his ideas is not recognizably science as scientists 
know it. Consequently, even sympathetic critics were ambivalent about how to assess Jung‘s 
contribution to science. In a 1954 review for Nature, Westmann commented that the book in focus (a 
collection of Jung‘s writings) ―shows the fundamental weakness of Jung‘s psychology, which by 
having no fixed scheme appears to be full of contradictions and paradoxes; but this weakness is at the 
same time a sign of his greatness‖ ([30], p. 842). He elucidates by citing Heraclitus‘s adage that you 
cannot step twice into the same river, and averring that ―the life in the psyche manifests itself thus‖ ([30], 
p. 842). Talking of ―life in the psyche‖ as taken-for-granted locates the speaker in the historical 
moment when the peculiarly modern Western conception of the self as an atomic unit was at its zenith. 
That conception has led to postulations of a universal mental structure as a necessity of nature. Jung 
reasoned, ―Just as the human body represents a whole museum of organs, with a long evolutionary 
history behind them, so we should expect the mind to be organized in a similar way‖ ([31], par. 522). 
And yet, this inner structure is in constant flux like the proverbial river.  
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Despite the proliferation of Jungian books in the second half of the twentieth century, there are no 
more reviews of such books in Nature after 1961 [32]. Readers of Nature are no longer expected to be 
interested in a mystical psychology. Contemporary scholars who study Jung are far more likely to be 
based in the humanities than in the behavioral or social sciences.  
Analytical psychology has been thoroughly removed from the scientific gaze. While there are sound 
reasons for dismissing claims that analytical psychology is scientific [5,6], there are not-so-good 
reasons, based in ignorance and misconceptions, for dismissing Jung. ―We American psychologists are 
brought up to think of Jung as a mystic‖ ([33], p. 34). This applies also to British psychologists; or, 
rather, we have been brought up to think of Jung as a non-entity. In a typical syllabus, Jung features as 
a historical footnote to Freud. The Freudian story, which depicts Jung as a dissenting disciple, 
persisted after the behaviorists had debunked Freudianism. It was retained after behaviorism had given 
way to cognitivism. By the time that social constructionist critics of cognitivism appeared on the scene, 
Jungianism was too remote even to criticize. Meanwhile Freud was rediscovered, partially reinvented, 
by luminaries of postmodernism, and consequently arrived also in some variants of postmodern 
psychology. Jung remains excluded. Psychologists‘ heightened moral and political sensitivities 
coincided with highly publicized allegations of Jung‘s Nazi sympathies and anti-Semitism. The 
allegations are mostly unfounded [34,35], but the scandal has placed Jung off-bounds: ―For political 
reasons I cannot allow myself to read Jung with pleasure,‖ stated Billig ([36], p. 6).  
Reading Jung is difficult with the best of will. The vast sweep of his eclectic knowledge results in 
verbose density and opacity. Navigating his voluminous writings inevitably means selecting threads of 
personal interest. Hence, Jung speaks differently to different readers. While there are books that 
reliably disseminate Jungian theory at a basic level, any simplification forfeits what historian 
Pietikäinen has aptly described as the kaleidoscopic nature of Jung‘s psychology [37]. Many Jung-
oriented publications have little in common with each other, and some have a dubious relation to 
Jung‘s own work. There is ―a profusion of ‗book-length commercials of Jungian therapy‖ and 
―pseudo-religious apologetics‖ ([37], p. 27). There are also works of academic excellence in analytical 
psychology; but their content tends to be too esoteric for the uninitiated. All that does not help to make 
Jung‘s work a respectable pursuit for a behavioral scientist.  
5. Obstacles to Bringing Jung into the Fold 
In and out of academia, ―Jung‖ has become a kind of brand name that can be stamped on a variety 
of products. Since Jung regarded himself as first and foremost a psychologist, it is ironic that his work 
is appreciated by psychologists least of all. For the ―typical‖ psychologist, the above barriers to 
engaging with Jung‘s work are compounded by bafflement about what he was doing exactly. Readers 
of Jung schooled in the humanities may recognize a hermeneutic approach in his interpretation of 
myths, ancient scripts, and patients‘ fantasies and dreams. Traditionally trained academic psychologists 
are not attuned to such methods. It is not clear how Jung gets from observation to theory. His transition 
from observing recurrent motifs in clinical and mythological material to a full-blown theory of 
archetypes is too rapid. He seems to be reading into the material his own expectations about the 
structure and dynamics of the psyche. Jung‘s hypotheses must be taken on faith. Believers see the evidence 
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everywhere, and seem to understand the task of empirical research as a matter of compiling catalogues 
of instances. It is not the logic of scientific discovery (cf. [38]; see [4–6] for an expanded discussion). 
Jung talked the talk but didn‘t do the walk. For most psychologists, it is primarily the praxis  
of psychological inquiry that differentiates it from other disciplines that also investigate mind  
and behavior. To some psychologists, it is not just any methodology but specifically the  
hypothetico-deductive method that makes it a science. Not all psychologists adhere to it in practice; 
but historically that classic ideal has dominated the behavioral sciences. The hypothetico-deductive 
method had been proposed by William Whewell in the nineteenth century, though it was Popper who 
has given it its best-known articulation [38]. In the 1930s, Popper contested the then-prevalent 
viewpoint associated with logical positivism, which regarded inductive reasoning as the basis for 
scientific inquiries. Induction proceeds from an initial explanation of some observations to its 
confirmation by collecting further empirical examples. This epistemological sin can be found in Jung‘s 
progression from (a) observing recurrent motifs in dreams, visions, myths, etc., through (b) theorizing 
those as archetypal manifestations, to (c) seeking to conform the existence of archetypes by observing 
more instances of the same.  
Despite Jung‘s scientific stance, it is difficult to assimilate his ideas into the behavioral sciences not 
only due to how he went about validating them but also due to a lack of obvious connections with the 
ongoing preoccupations of the behavioral sciences. Even within Jungian circles, it is far from clear 
what ―archetype‖ really means—lively debates continue to present day—partly because Jung‘s own 
ideas changed over time [39]. Brooke attributed the difficulties that ―psychologists of other persuasions‖ 
have with the concept to the fact that ―archetypes seem mysterious, deep, remote, frightening, and 
enchanting, and thinking about them remains equally murky and ambivalent‖ ([40], p. 157). From my 
position as a non-Jungian psychologist, the problem is not necessarily the murkiness of the concept. 
There is little certainty at the cutting edge of science. If the concept were to excite scientists, its 
ramifications would have been explored. Rather, it is the point of postulating archetypes in the first 
place which eludes us ―psychologists of other persuasions‖. The very postulation seems redundant, a 
solution to a non-existing problem, an answer to a question that nobody else is asking.  
6. Science versus Art 
The concept of archetypes failed to interest behavioral scientists, but has long fired the imagination 
of artists and literary writers. Jung‘s theory is a powerful narrative. It might be correct in the way that a 
poem or a literary novel is correct; that is, as a whole coherent unto itself, all its elements in perfect 
relation to each other. A poetic gestalt-image impacts upon us aesthetically and emotionally 
irrespective of the factual veracity of its content. Whereas science seeks to establish objective truths 
about the world (and human nature) by narrowing down rival interpretations, the poetic process creates 
subjective truths through the multiplicity of overlain images and subjective connotations.  
Jung uses a similar strategy (cf. [41]). His hypotheses are speculative explanations—not  
testable predictions à la Popper—and he builds them by piling examples upon examples. Making a 
similar point, Hillman commented that Jung uses the word ―empirical‖ to refer to a subjective process 
within him: ―The empirical event—the solar-phallus image in a patient—releases a movement in the 
mind setting off a hypothesis … as a poem may start in a concrete perception‖; and like a poet, ―Jung 
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returns ever and again to the concrete world of perceptions (cases, dreams, religious fantasies, ancient 
texts)‖ ([42], p. 32–33).  
Jung struggled with the incommensurability of science and art. In a talk on poetry, he asserted his 
standpoint as a scientist by endorsing the view of the two as mutually exclusive: ―Art is by its very 
nature not science, and science by its very nature is not art‖ ([43], par. 99). The conflict came to his 
awareness in a typically Jungian manner, through a fantasy generated by his unconscious [44]. In 
1913, whilst writing down disturbing fantasies he was having, he wondered, ‗―What is this I am doing, 
it certainly is not science, what is it?‖—and a voice from nowhere told him it was art, a suggestion he 
strongly resisted though conceding that ―obviously it wasn‘t science‖ ([44], p. 42). The ambivalence 
carries across to his formal exposition of his theory. Analytical psychology is premised on the 
hypothesis that the psyche is an autonomous reality commanding specific energy. Yet such hypothesis 
―has its disadvantages for the scientific mind,‖ Jung comments; and continues, ―In accordance with  
my empirical attitude I … prefer to describe and explain symbol-formation as a natural process‖ ([45], 
par. 338). His preference discloses a language game in Wittgenstein‘s sense (cf. [46]). Language 
games are not ―games‖ but profoundly shape attitudes and perceptions. In Jung‘s milieu, the language 
game of science empowered those who came up with theories using words such as instincts, evolution, 
and energy; and eschewed words such as spirit. Jung labored to disengage his theorizing from religious 
mystification, seeking instead to explain all psychological phenomena as based in natural processes.  
7. Conclusions  
Jung‘s theory feels as true to some because it sounds scientific; to others it feels as false because it 
only sounds like that [5]. This seems like a deadlock of opinions. Instead of pinning the merit of Jung‘s 
legacy on a categorical judgment of scientific/non-scientific status, it may be best to evaluate it in 
terms of applicability. We should ask, for whom and in what context does it serve particular purposes, 
and whether those would be served by the scientific method.  
The appeal of the Jungian approach in psychotherapy is evident in the worldwide success of the 
movement, but the clinical utility of particular concepts or techniques is not the same as their potential 
for generating hypotheses that scientists may explore in pure basic research. As seen, Jung himself 
made a categorical distinction between analytical psychology and experimental psychology [20]. 
Elsewhere, I revisit the implications of the differences between the practitioner‘s ethic and the 
scientist‘s ethic for analytical psychology and other contemporary approaches to the self [47].  
Analytical psychology is not monolithic. It has its factions, and those too continuously evolve. 
Nevertheless, in all its versions, it concerns the holistic inner experience. It provides a way of thinking 
about and working with inner experiences. Hence, to echo Dilthey, it cannot be adequately served by 
methods of the natural sciences. Conversely, analytical psychology cannot readily serve a purpose in 
the behavioral sciences (in my view). It is clearly not a science of behavior in the way that the 
behaviorists have envisaged it. It is not a science of the mind in the way that cognitive science has 
been. By labeling it a psychology with the psyche, Jung implicitly positions its practitioner—not as 
someone who detachedly studies something called a psyche—but as someone trained to apply his or 
her own psyche as a tool towards trying to fathom how human beings attune themselves to own existence.  
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